Sit right back and you’ll hear a tale…
 
In this fictional account, Able Bentley Capital is a $500 million private equity fund (“ABC”).  ABC is formed as a Delaware limited partnership, and the general partner (“GP”) is ABC Partners.  (For a discussion of limited partnerships, see my post “LP Corner: US Private Equity Fund Structure - The Limited Partnership.”)  ABC makes a number of international investments.  Bill Smith is one of managing partners of the management company and a member of the GP.  Bill sources and leads several international investments.  It is common in international investments to have the fund’s investment flow through one or more intermediate (known as “blocker”) shell companies in order to shield the fund from negative tax consequences.  Using a complicated blocker structure, Bill was able to defraud ABC out of several million dollars.  The fraud was eventually discovered and after several years Bill was convicted of fraud and embezzlement.
 
Situations where a GP (or a principal of the GP or management company) behave truly badly are rare, but they do occur.  The question becomes, what should happen when really bad behavior occurs?  Read on to find out!
 
To read more, please click “Read More” below.

Divorce, Private Equity style...

Private equity funds have long lives.  Private equity limited partnership agreements (LPAs) typically provide for an initial 10-year term, plus two one-year extensions at the discretion of the general partner of the fund (GP).  However, fund terms often stretch out for much longer, sometimes 15 to 18 to 20 or more years.  This is truly a long-term commitment, for both the limited partners (LPs) and for the GP.  For an overview of LPs, GPs and limited partnerships, please see my prior post "LP Corner: US Private Equity Fund Structure - The Limited Partnership."
 
Because funds stay around for a long time, things will change.  Partners may leave the fund’s management company; the investment strategy might drift away from the initial strategy; the investment performance may be terrible to the point that the LPs want to stop the GP from investing; the fund or management firm may be embroiled in a scandal; or in rare cases, the GP may behave badly (not illegally or in violation of the LPA, but in ways that may place their personal interests above the best interests of the LPs).  There are many other changes that can occur during the life of a fund.

To read more, please click "Read More" to the right below.

This is a continuation of a series of posts on fund terms.  Prior posts include:

• Management Fee
• GP Commitment
• Carried Interest Overview
• Carried Interest – Preferred Return and GP Catchup
• GP Clawback
• Management Fee Offsets

When an LP invests in a fund, it is because the LP believes that the investment team will successfully invest the fund.  But what happens if members of that investment team leave the firm in the midst of investing?  What happens if a key member of the team dies, or is convicted of securities fraud?  A “key person” clause (historically known as a “key man” clause) provides LPs with protections in case these events, and others, occur.

To read more, please click on the "Read More" link below and to the right.

Why is it that most buyout funds, many growth equity funds and few venture capital funds have an 8% preferred return hurdle?  Why should there be a difference among the different strategies?
 
What is a preferred return hurdle?
A preferred return hurdle is a component of the fund manager’s carried interest. 
 
​To read more, please click on the "Read More" link below and to the right.

This is a continuation of a series of posts on fund terms.  Prior posts include:

• Management Fee
• GP Commitment
• Carried Interest Overview
• Carried Interest – Preferred Return and GP Catchup

 
In this post, we will explore what happens if the GP is paid too much carry.  Generally speaking, the GP must return the overpayment, and this is called the GP clawback.  But it’s not that simple, so read on!
 
How a GP Can be Paid Too Much Carry
In the prior post “LP Corner: Fund Terms – Carried Interest Overview” we discussed that there are two main types of carried interest – whole fund carry (also known as “European carry”) and deal-by-deal carry (also known as “American carry”). 
 
In whole fund carry, the GP is paid carry only after the fund has returned to the LPs all of their contributed capital.  This has the effect that the GP is paid carry later in the fund’s life (compared to deal-by-deal carry), and because the LPs are repaid all of their contributed capital before the GP takes its carry, it is pretty unlikely that the GP will receive too much carry. 
 
Conversely, in deal-by-deal carry, the GP can collect carry much earlier than under whole fund carry, and in some cases, the GP can be paid too much carry over the life of the fund.  Please review the example in the prior post for more detail on this and to see how too much carry can be paid.
 
To read more, please click on the "Read More" link below and to the right.

This is one of a series of posts on fund terms.  Other posts include:

• Management Fee
• GP Commitment
• Carried Interest Overview
• ​GP Clawback

In this post, we will explore two items relating to carried interest: preferred return and GP catchup.
 
Preferred Return Hurdle
A preferred return (or “hurdle rate”) is a minimum threshold return that LPs must receive before the GP can receive its carried interest (or “carry”).  The preferred return is usually expressed as a percentage return per year, and in private equity that is usually 8% per year.  This means that the LPs must receive an 8% annual return on their contributed capital before the GP can receive carry. 
 
GP Catchup
There are two types of preferred return hurdles: (1) a “pure preferred return” (also known as “hard preferred return”); and (2) a preferred return with GP catchup. 
 
Pure Preferred Return Hurdle.  In the pure preferred return hurdle, the GP only receives carry on gain in excess of the preferred return hurdle.  This has the impact of reducing the carry the GP receives over the life of the fund.  The pure preferred return hurdle is not used in private equity. 
 
Preferred Return with GP Catchup.  In a preferred return with GP catchup, once the preferred return hurdle is met, the GP receives all or most of the future profits until the GP catches up to its 20% carry amount, and after that the profits are split 80% to the LPs and 20% to the GP (for its normal carry).  The preferred return with GP catchup results in the GP receiving its entire 20% profit share.  This version of preferred return hurdle is the norm in the private equity industry.

To read more, please click on the "Read More" link below and to the right.

This is one of a series of posts on fund terms.  Other posts include:

• Management Fee
• GP Commitment
• Carried Interest – Preferred Return and GP Catchup
• GP Clawback ​

Carried Interest Overview
As discussed in my prior post on management fee, the long-standing fee model for private equity funds has been a “2 and 20” model, referring to a 2% management fee and a 20% carried interest.  But what is this “carried interest?” 
 
Read on!
 
Carried interest, also known as “carry,” “profit participation,” “promote” or the "distribution waterfall," is the share of the fund’s profit the fund’s manager (also known as “general partner” or “GP”) earns if the fund returns a profit to the fund’s investors (also known as “limited partners” or “LPs”).  See my prior post "LP Corner: US Private Equity Fund Structure - The Limited Partnership" for more detailed descriptions of LPs and the GP.
 
When a private equity fund calls capital from its LP investors (this is known as “paid-in-capital’ or “called capital” - see my prior post "LP Corner: On Committed Capital, Called Capital and Uncalled Capital" for further discussion of this topic), the GP manager of the fund will use that capital to make investments and to pay for fund expenses, such as management fee.  When the investments are realized, the amount in excess of the original investment amount is profit. 
 
The Two types of Carry: Whole Fund and Deal-by-Deal
There are two main types of carry: whole fund carry and deal-by-deal carry. 
 
To read more, please click on the "Read More" link below and to the right.

This is one of a series of posts on fund terms.  Other posts include:

• ​GP Commitment
• Carried Interest Overview
• Carried Interest – Preferred Return and GP Catchup
• GP Clawback

In private equity, the term “2 and 20” refers to the traditional compensation structure for private equity funds: 2% management fee and 20% performance fee (also known as “carried interest” or “carry”).
 
In this post, we will explore management fee.
 
Historically, management fee was intended to provide fund managers with enough money to pay modest salaries, rent modest offices and incur modest expenses.  It was said that management fee was intended to let the fund manager “keep the lights on” and that the performance fee (known as “carried interest” or “carry”) was where the fund manager made its money.  While investors in private equity funds (known as “limited partners” or “LPs”) continue to take this view, terms in fund documents (known as the "limited partnership agreement" or "LPA") relating to management fee have become more complex.
 
Let’s dig in.
 
In previous posts, we have explored committed capital and the investment period:

• LP Corner: On Committed Capital, Called Capital and Uncalled Capital
• LP Corner: the Four Phases in the Life of a Private Equity Fund
• LP Corner: Private Equity Cash Flows from the LP Perspective

 
We will look at management fee in three phases of a fund’s life: the investment period, the harvesting (or realization) period and during extensions.

To read more, please click on the "Read More" link below and to the right.

This is one of a series of posts on fund terms.  Other posts include:

• Management Fee
• ​Carried Interest Overview
• Carried Interest – Preferred Return and GP Catchup
• GP Clawback

Private equity funds (buyout, venture capital and growth equity funds) are typically structured as limited partnerships, which have two types of partners: limited partners, or LPs, which are passive investors in the fund; and a general partner, or GP, which is the manager of the fund.  As I evaluate funds, one of the fund terms that receives special attention is the amount of money the GP will commit to the fund - which is called "GP Commitment", "GP Capital Commitment" or "GP Commit."  ​

To read more, please click "Read More" to the lower right.